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Taking Evolution Seriously: A Matter of Primate Intelligence
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone

Except insofar as theory is concerned, philosophers tend to place evolution at an
exclusively scientific address. In practice this means they divorce historical
significances of evolution from their particular theoretical concerns - from
axiomatic formulations derived from population genetics or molecular biology.
for example - and subsequently ignore them. The overall eITect of standard
practice is not only to overlook the vast temporal span and diversity of life
preceding the immediate human present, but to disregard the more intimately
related science of paleoanthropology. Where, for example, do we read of
primordial language, ancestral hominid tool-making, burial practices, or cave
paintings in the context of philosophical investigations of human language,
cognition, or art? Even in the philosophy of science, philosophers unifonnly
bypass paleoanthropology, most often in favor of either a neurophysiology whose
centerfold features the brain and its circuitry, or an anorexic biology whose living
flesh is so emaciated as to be virtually absent. Standard philosophic practice is
well exemplified by Michael Ruse in his The Philosophy ofBiology, a book devoted
to showing that the theory of evolution is not dissimilar from theories in the
physical sciences, and that the single discipline of population genetics (reducible
ultimately to molecular biology) stands at the explanatory center of evolutionary
theory. Ruse mentions the historical side of evolution but only to argue away its
centrality to evolutionary theory. Linking paleontology to what is de.ad and long
gone - to bare fossils and little more - he in fact calls evolution with its historical
aspect intact an "old concept", and refers to "the supposedly historical nature of
organic phenomena". 1 For Ruse, as for many philosophers,2 molecular genetics
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alone olTers a bona fide philosophical basis for examining and understanding
evolutionary theory.
Standard philosophic practice is equally well exemplified by the ongoing,
complex "unit of selection" controversy.3 The question of the level(s) at which
selection acts and of whether there is a "true unit of selection"4 is not without
interest - either to biologists or to philosophers. Neither was the question of
fitness which occupied centerstage several years back.5 However, when such
questions are taken as paradigmatic of the type of question of proper concern to
philosophers of biology, then not only are concerns about concrete historical
processes of evolution, including human evolution, nowhere in evidence, but the
total absence of these historical concerns from philosophical discussion strongly
suggests that they are not properly the province of philosophers at all but only
of biologists. In other words, with respect to actual evolutionary processes that
have taken place, the attitude of the philosopher of biology is, "there is no
philosophy of biology to be done there". Even in philosophical contexts in
which concerns with historical significances of evolution appear to be central,
there is not uncommonly a noticeable gap. The Philosophy of Biology in
Historical and Cultural Contexts course that was olTered through the National
Endowment for the Humanities to philosophers in the summer of 1989 is a case
in point. Although ample attention was called to Darwin, the "Darwinian
tradition". and "Darninism" in the two hundred and twenty-five word course
description. the historical side of evolution - the side that Darwin was at pains
to explain - was nowhere alluded to. The irony was compounded by the fact
that, though the intent was in part to develop ''a new and humanistically richer
philosophy of science", paleoanthropology was nowhere mentioned.
A further exemplification of standard philosophic practice centers on
philosophers' interest in nonhuman animals, particularly but not exclusively in
the context of philosophy of mind.6 The intent in these philosophical enterprises
is generally to shed light on the relationship between human and nonhuman
intelligence. For example, the intent has recently been "to help cognitive
ethologists to interpret their findings",7 or to aid cognitively-oriented scientists
by supplying them "a descriptive language and method that are neither
anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to
particular "infonnation-processing models".8 Standard philosophic practice is
apparent in such enterprises when, in the drawing of comparisons or
implications. philosophers fail to take evolution, particularly our own human
evolution. into account. The result is a failure to realize that short of divine
intervention. human rationality and human language are themselves products of
evolution, and not in the sense of novel neural brain circuitry gradually (much
less suddenly) appearing such that communally understood words began
sprouting from the mouths of a few no doubt surprised-because-heretofore
verbally-mute hominids, but in the sense of actual living creatures inventing new
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modes of behavior. Jonathan Bennett, in his 1987 Presidential Address to the
Eastern Division American Philosophical Association, noticeably ignores human
evolution in just this way. To begin with, he states that his aim is to specify "[the]
main differences there are between Homo sapiens and other known terrestrial
species, or (for short) between man and beast". He elaborates this aim by saying
that he thinks we humans all intuit the same difference - "I think we have the
same picture of the difference, the same sense of what it is"9 - and that his
purpose is to try to "parlay" that picture or intuition into "an agreed
description" .10 By way of further elaboration, he says that the difference he is
interested in descriptively pinpointing is a difference in kind and not in degree,
and this on the basis of what we already think is there. that is, on the basis of
"what we already know about us and about them". The problem of course is
what "we" do not know about us and about them. As is clear from what has been
said thus far of standard philosophic practice, Bennett ignores what philosophers
generally tend to ignore; that is, he tends to discount as relevant knowledge the
actual historical process of evolution and with it, our own hominid history, the
study of our own human evolutionary past.11 The import of this neglect is
sizable. One aspect of it will become readily apparent in what follows. Suffice to
say here that without this historical dimension, those philosophical studies that
aim at discovering relationships between human and nonhuman intelligence can
never be anything more than a comparison between present-day humans and
present-day chimpanzees (or gorillas, or orang-utans, or baboons, or lemurs, or
langurs, or vervet monkeys, and so on - or pigeons and crows,12 for that matter).
They will never tell us anything in an evolutionary, i.e., substantively biological including ethological - sense about "what makes us special".13 They reduce
simply to philosophical justifications for cherishing ourselves.
Standard philosophic practice is not uncommonly queer in an etymological
sense, in the sense that what evolves are precisely organic wholes, and in the
sense that understanding humanness was at least in the beginning what
constituted the pursuit of philosophy. The counters identified in a molecular
biology and/or formulated in an axiomatic system, for example, are not the
stuff of evolution - the actual living process in virtue of which we are here today.
That process is defined by all those sensing, moving creatures who found and
made their niche in the world in myriad ways over eons of time - some of them
successfully, many quite unsuccessfully - and it includes those creatures who
constitute the subject matter of paleoanthropology and who, as relatives,
should be dear to our human hearts. A concern with molecular regularities and
with explanation - with evolutionary theory qua theory - need not devalue a
concern with that historical process or the creatures who define it - with
evolutionary theory qua evolutionary theory. More than this, the concern need
not saw off the branches that support it. In default of an historical dimension,
there could be other theories in biology - theories of spontaneous generation, of
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animal spmts, of a sentiment interieur, and other formulations in the
conceptual style of a pre-Darwinian biology, but there would be no theory of
evolution. 14 Furthermore, as emphasized, to ignore the historical aspects of
evolution is to omit understandings of our ancestral kinfolk, thus to disregard
significant dimensions of our own human evolution. Especially in light of their
considerable accomplishments, our kinfolk matter. As with our own families,
our biological Family tells us something about ourselves. When we examine
our ancestral past, we learn something about who we are. Such an examination
is what in a truly philosophical sense Darwinian evolutionary theory was
originally all about.
Darwin wrote three major books on evolution: The Origin of Species, The
Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, and The Expression of the
Emotions in Man and Animals. 15 In the first of these consecutive formulations,
Darwin considers physical characters and behavior; in the second he considers
mental powers and moral qualities, and then proceeds to a study of sexual
behavior; in the third he turns his attention to emotions. It is clear from these
successive writings that Darwin is both an organic and evolutionary wholist.
His initial concern with distinct aspects of animate form notwithstanding, he
clearly regards animals not as piecemeal assemblages nor as reflex machines on
the order of "protoplasmic record changers", 16 but as, in eminent British
biologist J.S. Haldane's phrase, "persistent wholes"; 17 and he furthermore
regards the attributes and capacities of all creatures to have evolved. In
consequence, evolutionary continuities pertain not simply to atomistic parts or
to physical bodies but to animals as living wholes. By the same measure, they
pertain not to some creatures but to all creatures: evolutionary continuities are
evident throughout the animal kingdom, including humans, and they are
describable in physical, mental, moral, sexual, and emotional terms. Darwin's
three books attest incontrovertibly to this conception.
Darwin's wholistic conception of evolutionary continuities is never
mentioned in 20th century Western scientific or philosophic circles. It has never
been openly challenged. It has never been methodically rebutted. It has simply
been ignored. By 20th century Western standards, only The Origin ofSpecies and
the second half of The Descent - Selection in Relation to Sex - count as
evolutionary theory. The rest is silence, but not necessarily because one knows
not of what one might speak. On the contrary, an affirmation of evolutionary
continuities beyond the merely physical is an obvious dimension of, for
example, NASA programs utilizing nonhuman animals; medical and
psychological studies of behavior in which nonhuman animals figure as subjects;
language-learning programs featuring especially chimpanzees, but also including
gorillas, orang-utans, and parrots; and more. The pressing question then is, why
is there a selective reading of Darwin? Since never explicitly discredited, why is
his organic and evolutionary wholism not taken seriously?
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Behaviorism and logical positivism might go a long way in answering the
question, but they are far from providing the whole answer. With respect to the
neglect of "the descent of man", the whole answer would likely take in cultural
relativism and the not unrelated structuralist emphasis on synchrony over
diachrony since both doctrines, in eschewing in one way and another the
notion of 'getting back', would see no philosophical significance in the descent
itself and/or no cultural relevance of the descent to modem humans. Each of
these avenues of response would be interesting to consider. The focus here,
however, will be on a quite different answer, namely, anthropocentrism.
Because it has not been previously exposed, because it sheds a basic and
particularly penetrating light on the selective reading of Darwin and the decline
of his organic and evolutionary wholism, and because, in turn, it accords
"man" carte blanche powers over "beast" and thus ultimately has far-reaching
ethical implications, the practice of anthropocentrism is of considerable interest
and import. Detailed consideration will show that the central issue is not
fundamentally that of attributing human characteristics to nonhuman animals,
i.e., anthropomorphism, but of assuming humans as the center of the animate
world such that, for example, any assessment of nonhuman mental powers
must take as its standard of measurement a human mind.
The charge of anthropomorphism is normally a pejorative judgment
rendered upon a person who purportedly interprets the behavior of nonhuman
creatures in ways which wrongly humanize the behavior and which in tum
credit the creatures with far more in the way of intelligence than the creatures
actually deserve. Morgan's canon is rigorously adhered to by scientists as a
bulwark against anthropomorphism. Morgan's canon dictates that no
nonhuman animal behavior may be interpreted at a higher level if it can be
explained at a lower level. 18 The canon is often equated to parsimony, though
Occam's notion of parsimony was tied to maintaining a spartan explanatory
ontology, not to the formulation of what must be regarded self-serving
explanatory protocols. What the charge of anthropocentrism pinpoints and
calls into critical question is precisely the customary practice in virtue of which
the charge of anthropomorphism is purportedly avoided in the first place. Most
simply stated, it is the charge that reading humanness out is an anthropocentric
act. By such an act, nonhuman creaturely life is interpreted in ways that
consistently exalt the measure of humanness: humans become special creations.
Man is indeed the measure of all things in such a world, man understood here
not as independently-perceiving individuals but as self-privileging beings
apportioning sub-mental credit from on high to the whole of nonhuman
animate life. 19 Indeed, the act of reading out is an aggrandizing gesture by
which the whole human species is plucked out - saved as it were - from its place
in the evolutionary mainstream of life.20 It is thus clear why to depreciate
nonhuman animal behavior is a denial of evolutionary wholism. The same
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strict interpretive rule that applies to nonhuman animals - Morgan's canon does not apply to humans. In consequence, humans can be as generous
and self-flattering as they please toward themselves. They can declare, for
example, that without exception all humans have an intelligence that in every
instance is uniquely superior to that of nonhuman animals. Thus whatever
the navigational abilities, tool-using/tool-making skills, distinctive cultural
practices,21 and other demonstrable modes of nonhuman animal intelligence
might be, they are necessarily of a lower order, an order that is discontinuous
with the navigational abilities, tool-using/tool-making skills, distinctive cultural
practices, and so on, of modern humans. The charge of anthropocentrism calls
into question the practice of protecting and privileging humankind in this way.
It affirms the fact that it is as anthropocentric to deal humans all the cards as it
is to deal nonhuman animals too many aces.
Clearly, so long as anthropomorphism is the perenially favored scapegoat,
anthropocentrism goes unrecognized and unacknowledged as its parent form;
anthropomorphism and its inverse are both forms of anthropocentrism.
Anthropocentrism is thus primary and the charge of anthropocentrism can
actually be made from either of two directions. Consider, for example, the
conveniently ignored but seminal collateral question raised by the quest for
objectivity and the linking of anthropomorphism with a lack of objectivity. In a
recent article in The Chronicle of Higher Education titled "Scientists rethink
anthropomorphism", writer Kim A. McDonald begins by describing the
linkage: "Long considered taboo among researchers studying animals,
anthropomorphism violates a central tenet of science: that researchers should
strive to be totally objective and dispassionate observers of nature. As a result,
scientists who suggest that animals possess intentions, emotions, or other
qualities assumed to be uniquely human are often viewed by colleagues as
careless, gullible, or even irresponsible... So despised is the practice that animal
researchers can discredit others in their field by simply labeling their work
anthropomorphic" (italics added).22 McDonald goes on to say that animal
researchers such as Marc Bekoff are now vindicating the practice of
anthropomorphism on the grounds of its being "a valuable scientific tool".23
The conveniently ignored collateral question concerns the exoneration of
reverse anthromorphism. In particular, why are anthropocentrists who
privilege humans by reading humanness out not similarly scarified by their
failure to be "totally objective and dispassionate observers of nature"? Surely
human arrogance is a liability, and not "a valuable scientific tool"? As a
further example, consider that humans are merely one among ten million
species and that, their numerical insignificance notwithstanding, they readily
pronounce judgments on all remaining 9,999,999 species, and this even though,
philosophically speaking, they have not been able to show convincingly much
less conclusively that they are not dreaming or a part of someone else's
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dream.24 Clearly, anthropocentrism has a much larger compass than commonly
recognized, and an unrestrained one at that.
In the most basic sense, the dual liabilities of anthropocentrism should lead
us to ponder seriously and at length the inescapability of our human
perspective. But they should lead us at the same time to an immediate
acknowledgment of the necessarily limited range of our understandings and of
our correlative need to temper proclivities toward human arrogance and in
turn, monitor critically our judgments of nonhuman creatures accordingly.
Most specifically, they should lead us to the realization that, particularly with
respect to judging the intelligence of nonhuman animals, it is far more
reasonable - and in turn morally far wiser - to err on the side of generosity than
on the side of miserliness. Evolutionary theory, with its emphasis on "persistent
wholes", informs us of this reasonability and instructs us toward just such
judgments. It implicitly demonstrates to us that organic wholism, like
evolutionary wholism, falls by the wayside with reverse anthropomorphism. It
implicitly attests that reading humanness out is substantively far more
pernicious than reading humanness in. With reverse anthropomorphism,
intelligence and cognitive acumen - in broad terms, all capacities customarily
associated with mind - are divorced from the body and regarded special
creations along with their unique human possessors.25 In short, the belief
implicit in this form of anthropocentrism is that unlike the human body the
human mind never evolved. Presumably it arose sui generis, deus ex machina, or
by interplanetary intervention - perhaps we are the artificial intelligence of
creatures on Alpha Centauri. It is instructive to call attention to an apparently
ill-recognized fact and curious practice connected with the belief. Philosophers
- and other non-science people as well - who bring nonhuman animals into the
human picture typically use them in a way quite unlike evolutionary
scientists.26 Comparisons of humans to extant nonhumans, particularly
primates, are made by primatologists, paleoanthropologists, and other
evolutionary scientists not on behalf of specifying immediate relationships but
far distant ones: the behavior of extant nonhuman primates serves as an
analogical measuring stick for reckoning ancestral hominid behavior. This way
of using data gathered on nonhuman animals, or this use of "the comparative
method" (as evolutionary scientists term it), is quite different from the way in
which philosophers are prone to using it, namely, either to substantiate or to
deny a resemblance between 'us and them', 'here and now'. In short, unlike
evolutionary scientists, philosophers do not consider primate or other
nonhuman animal data in evolutionary perspective. 27 It is because of this that
the much-prized treasure, human uniqueness, can be so effortlessly secured: so
long as the method is misunderstood, the evolutionary significance of
nonhuman animal behavioral studies is missed; so long as the evolutionary
significance of these studies is missed, our own evolution is ignored; so long as
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our own evolution is ignored, our kinfolk are ignored, and so long as our
kinfolk are ignored, a miserly anthropocentrism is easily installed and practiced
with the result that an organic and evolutionary wholism continually gives
ground to special creation.
It is with great interest one reads in Hume a lengthy footnote explaining
both why humans differ among themselves with respect to reasoning powers,
and why humans differ from nonhumans with respect to the same capacities.
Hume's explanation is in principle strikingly similar to Darwin's explanation of
differing capacities among individual creatures with respect to a differential
mortality and reproduction, so much so that Hume's explanation appears to be
not simply prescient but perhaps even a direct influence on Darwin. That
Darwin read Hume has been noted by historians of science. 28 But historians
have not observed the remarkable correspondence between Darwin's and
Hume's accounts of differing capacities. For both Darwin and Hume, the latter
were a matter of individual, native dispositions, whether human or nonhuman.
Hurne writes of individual humans differing "in attention and memory and
observation", for example, in the ability "to carry on a chain of consequences",
and in "the forming of general maxims from particular observation".29 The
same native differential abilities that explain "the great difference" aniong
humans in their various capacities to reason, Hume states, explain the great
difference in various reasoning capacities between humans and nonhumans.
For his part, Darwin first of all affirms that "if no organic being excepting man
had possessed any mental power, or if his powers had been of a wholly
different nature from those of the lower animals, then we should never have
been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had been gradually
developed. But it can be clearly shewn that there is no fundamental difference
of this kind". 30 He then proceeds to give evidence showing that "man and the
higher animals, especially the Primates, have the same senses, intuitions and
sensations - similar passions, affections, and emotions... they feel wonder and
curiosity; they possess the same faculties of imitation, attention, memory,
imagination, and reason, though in very different degrees". 3 1 In sum, for
Darwin as for Hume, just as there is a difference in degree and not in kind in
capacities among animals of the same species, so there is a difference in degree
and not in kind between different species, i.e., between humans and
nonhumans. In consequence, for neither Hume nor Darwin are there Rubicons
to be crossed in accounting for human 'minds'. Put in evolutionary perspective,
this means not only that "mental powers" (to use Darwin's phrase) evolved,
but that they evolved as a dimension of animate life.
Careful readings of Darwin's three classic works on evolution reveal many
times over an organic and evolutionary wholism in opposition to the idea of
special creation. Special creation and the practice of anthropocentrism that in
part upholds it are clearly inconsistent with evolutionary theory. Present-day
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philosophy of biology thus has another and quite different task from the one it
presently addresses: to expose the inconsistency in all its guises and in
consequence show how evolution is to be taken seriously, and can be taken
seriously in the very doing of philosophy. The task in fact has far-reaching
consequences for philosophy, beginning with a Cartesian metaphysics and
ending with a justifiable human ethics insofar as wholistic themes support
evolutionary continuities and evolutionary continuities raise certain questions
both about the evolution of mind and about the human treatment of
nonhuman animals. The task in this longer view might more rightly be
designated an intra-disciplinary one in that it necessitates a broad philosophical
perspective. It can be exemplified with respect to a Cartesian metaphysics,
specifically the classic mind/body dichotomy, by two seminal question: can
bodies evolve in the absence of mental powers?; and correlatively, can mental
powers evolve in the absence of bodies? Suggestions follow as to the kind of
evidence to be considered ifjust and sound answers are to be had.
Of prime importance with respect to the first question are situations in
which a creature is engaged in some constructional activity, constructional in
the sense of the creature's devising from moment to moment in the light of a
particular and immediate play of events. Thus, beavers building dams or
lionesses hunting zebras - in fact hunting and hunted animals generally - must
take into account the particular moment by moment situation as it develops.
There are no tapes on which all the right moves are recorded such that no
matter what the exigency, a neurological program exists. Constructional
activity clearly calls into serious question the idea that bodies have evolved or
can evolve in the absence of mental powers. 32
What must furthermore be considered is the fact that animals are from time to
time initiating agents. They begin practicing new strategies, for example, or they
implement new behaviors such that an entire group of creatures begins behaving
in new ways. Not only is there now classic evidence of initiating agents in primate
groups studied by Japanese primatologists,33 but many of our own kinfolk were
initiating agents. Consistent bipedality was a new practice; tool-making was a new
practice; burying the dead was a new practice; speaking was a new practice;
counting was a new practice; cave-painting was a new practice. Present-day
humans can look back as far as three and a half million years and find new
practices. All of the practices attest to new concepts, as detailed research has
shown. 34 All of the practices were initiated by hominids. The point of signal
importance is that while all humans are hominids, not all hominids are humans. As
represented by the subspecies Homo sapiens sapiens, humans arose only some
40,000 years ago. 35 On the basis of paleoanthropological evidence to date, we can
thus conclude that with one exception, the above-mentioned practices were initiated
by nonhuman primates. Recognition of the evidence thus mandates a recognition
of mental powers outside an elitist human circle and provides powerful grounds
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for affirming that nonhuman living bodies, simply on the basis of their
nonhumanness, cannot reasonably be regarded as lacking mental powers.
Evidence of animals as initiating agents is equally significant to a just and
credible answer to the corollary question, can mental powers evolve in the
absence of bodies? Short of a body, one can only wonder where the felt
motivations, felt curiosities, and active explorations might be that sustain any
thoughtful endeavor such as burying an individual, chipping away at one stone
with another, or hammering away at something to see what is inside.36 It is not
a question of brains - not only because it is "persistent wholes", not brains, that
evolve - but because it is not brains that are motivated, curious, or explorative;
it is creatures who are. The nonsensical, even comic, consequences of thinking
otherwise are well exemplified by the biologist who affirmed that "nonhuman
primates have brains capable of cooperative hunting" ,37 as if when summoned
by hunger, it is brains that roll forth in concert to do battle on the savannah.
From a Darwinian perspective, it is difficult to deny that the evolution of
mental powers is tied to living bodies engaged in the real world of procuring
food, escaping danger, finding new resources, exploring a new terrain, making
choices in the pursuit of a mate, deterring rivals - in short, engaged in the
demanding, challenging, complex, practical business of making a living.
A just assessment of whether bodies can evolve in the absence of mental
powers would also have to take into account nonhuman animal behaviors that
fall outside formally devised protocols. Two primate psychologists interested in
tactically deceptive behavior have collected "anecdotal" data from a wide range
of primatologists whose formal writings omit reference to any such data. By
way of example, one of the contributing primatologists tells of a female gorilla
who, in the lead with four others behind her in a relatively straight line, was
travelling between feeding sites along a narrow trail. In the words of the
primatologist, "S [the female] looks up into Hypericum tree and spies a nearly
obscured clump of Loranthus vine. Without looking at those behind her, she sits
down by the side of the trail and begins to self-groom intently until the others
have passed her and all are out of sight... Only then did S stop 'self-grooming' to
rapidly climb into the tree, break off the vine clump and descend with it to the
trail to hastily feed on it before running to catch up with the group".38 The
utilization of such anecdotal data within animal behavioral studies is in general
sanctioned only by cognitively-oriented scientists and philosophers;39 it is not
sanctioned by behaviorists even though to omit anecdotal data is to leave gaps
in the record, thus to be less than objective by giving only a partial report indeed, to give a "subjectively-biased" account of animal behavior. By
comparison, no physicist or astronomer who found an anomaly would ignore it
on the basis of its being "anecdotal". Neither would students of human
behavior overlook such a ploy as that of the female gorilla in their investigations
and reported observations of human actions. Indeed, in the human instance, the
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ploy would undoubtedly be classified as "ingenious". One need only recall
Oliver North's cover-up to find what constituted for many Americans just such
an "ingenious" example of tactical deception.
However brief the above suggestions, they show that evolutionary biology
has much to contribute to the philosophical discussion and resolution of certain
metaphysical questions and intimately related ethical issues. In broader terms,
they show that Darwin's twin themes of organic and evolutionary wholism
clearly challenge us, both to expose inconsistencies in the evolutionary records
we keep and to keep those cleared-up records in sight as we ourselves do
philosophy. To be so challenged is of course to acknowledge being part of a
historical process infinitely larger than ourselves. The acknowledgment of that
history, like the acknowledgment of the earth's revolution around the sun or the
acknowledgment of our own death - the acknowledgment of any natural spatio
temporal system of change - is in fact not only rational, but perhaps the
necessary first step in understanding what it means to be rational, not to say in
living up to the star billing we give ourselves as rational animals. In her
interpretive essay on Aristotle's concept of pneuma and his concept of soul and
body in De Motu Animalium, Martha Nussbaum was led to remark on the fact
that "an essential part of [Aristotle's] search for the best account of animal
physiology was an examination of the goal-directed motions of the heavenly
spheres". In other words, for Aristotle, animal motion and heavenly motion
were essentially related and were to be studied and understood together.
Nussbaum's conclusion is that Aristotle's view affirmed that "no being can be
exhaustively studied without an account of his placement in the whole of
nature" - a 2,300 year-old view that coincides significantly with Darwin's
organic and evolutionary wholism.40
To achieve that view, what we perhaps need most basically, that is, to begin
with, is not a different conception of nonhuman animals - a different conception
that is as vital as Cavalieri and Singer have shown it to be41 - but a different
conception of ourselves. Indeed, a different conception of ourselves is primary
in the sense that to conceive ourselves as primates leads us in both directions at
once: to an acknowledgement of our own species-specific historical placement in
"the whole of nature" and at the same time to an acknowledgment of those
readily demonstrable ties that so intimately bind we primates in a common
creaturehood.42 With this re-conceptualized evolutionary view of ourselves, our
spontaneous disposition to read humanness in - anthropomorphism - is
precisely what we should expect to find in ourselves. Given our common
genealogical heritage, we primates are cut of the same cloth. To trace out the
ties that bind us in a common creaturehood does not mean that distinctions our species-specific differences - are ignored or effaced. It means only that
primate patterns of thinking, feeling, and behaving, being in fundamental ways
of an evolutionary piece, are brought to light and given their due.43
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